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Pursuant to this Court's Minute Entry dated January 6, 1992,
plaintiffs-appellees (,fSteelcofl) respond as follows to the Reply
Brief of defendants-appellants ("defendants") dated November 27,
1991.
General Comment. As in their Opening Brief, defendants in
their Reply generally offer testimony favorable to their position
and ignore the evidence supporting the trial court's decision.
Defendants' Reply repeatedly notes that factual statements in the
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argument portion of Steelco's Brief have no record references,
but record references for all factual assertions appear in the
statement of facts.

Defendants1 Reply advances unsupported and

inaccurate statements as to the evidence and record; space
constraints do not permit discussion of all those inaccuracies.
The underscored introductions below identify the portions of
defendants1 Reply that are the subject of discussion:
Introduction (pp.2-3).

Contrary to defendants1 suggestion,

Steelco's Brief contains no personal attacks upon (nor even a
single mention of) defendants' counsel.

Steelco's Brief does

accurately state that defendants were "misleading this Court11 in
claiming that the trial judge was hostile towards them.

A review

of defendants1 claim of Judge Russon's hostility (Opening Brief,
p.46 n.6) and the record references contained therein will
demonstrate that defendants are indeed misleading this Court as
to this irresponsible and unsupported claim.

Defendants1 claim

that Steelco's statement of facts is filled with improper "pejorative, exaggeration and argument" is completely unfounded.

At page 3, footnote 1, defendants offer these examples:
Steelco's (i) use of terms such as "vast" and "huge" for about
475,000 pounds of steel [Steelco Opening Brief, pp.47-48], (ii)
referring to "remnant" (as everyone did throughout trial and the
trial court specifically did in its Memorandum Decision), (iii)
referring to ''kickbacks*' (as Heaton, Chris Williams, and the
court did in its Memorandum Decision at R275), (iv) references to
"bargain prices" (the court found that defendants paid a "fraction of the true value" at R277) and "fraudulently inflated" (the
trial court in its Memorandum Decision at R275 found that the
steel was sold "at the inflated price" based upon a fraud).
Defendants also inaccurately state that Steelco's generalization

-2-

The limitation issue (p.5),

Defendants state that their

objections addressed limitations as to all of the conversion,
fraud, and conspiracy claims, citing R305-08.

There, only

conversion is mentioned -- "fraud11 and "conspiracy11 are not.
The discovery rule (pp.5-8).

At page 6, defendants remark-

ably suggest that the discovery rule does not apply to the
limitations period for a fraud case.

Section 78-12-26(3) provides

that the limitations period does not begin "until the discovery
by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud."
Defendants1 statement at page 7 that they "did nothing to conceal
the claim from Steelco" ignores the trial court's findings and
ignores the evidence of concealment advanced at pages 49-52 and
57-61 of Steelcofs Opening Brief.

Contrary to defendants1

suggestion, Hurst did refuse to speak with Elkington until he had
first spoken with his attorney.

[R452 at 130.]

At page 7,

defendants claim that Elkington "never returned to review records
from earlier years which were more difficult to locate," citing
R454 at 94-98.

There, Hurst testified that Elkington asked for

records concerning 1983 and 1984, but Hurst (i) couldn't locate
them and (ii) wouldn't release them without Heaton's permission.
In his deposition, Hurst flatly contradicted his trial testimony
by stating that Elkington never even asked to see records for
1984 or prior to 1985.

[R454, p.156.]

Hurst never testified

that Hurst and Heaton always met behind closed doors, which never
happened with anyone other than Hurst is "not supported by tHe
record." That exact testimony is found at R452 pp.26, 79-80.
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that he told Elkington the records were available or would be
made available, as defendants suggest.

Elkington testified that

he asked for information for years prior to 1985 but that Hurst
stated

f,

that such information was no longer available.M

134.]

The trial court believed Elkington.

[R452 at

At page 8, defendants

attempt to show that Heaton, not Hurst, did the concealing by
stating that at pages 46-47 of Steelco's Brief, Heatonfs name
appears many times and Wasatch Steel and Hurst are only infrequently mentioned.

But the pages chosen by defendants concern,

not concealment (as defendants suggest), but rather when Steelco
discovered the thefts and kickbacks.

Defendants1 concealment is

addressed at pages 49-52 and, by incorporation, pages 57-61.
There, Hurst and Wasatch Steel are mentioned about fifty times in
connection with their multiple acts of concealment.

Defendants

state "the brief recites that Heaton did this, and Heaton did
that.

It does not show anything that Mr. Hurst did or said.11

[Reply Brief at 8.]

Pages 49-52 of Steelco's Brief and, by

incorporation, pages 57-61, show a great deal that Mr. Hurst did
and said, including (i) his agreement to keep Heatonfs thefts and
his kickbacks a secret, (ii) his arrangement to cut checks to
Steelco for portions of the delivered materials to mislead
Steelco to believe it was being paid for all, (iii) his exclusively after-hour dealings exclusively with Heaton exclusively
behind closed doors, (iv) his nondisclosure to Steelco of the
multiple bribes he paid even though he recognized that it was a
"sleazy practice" and that he as an employer would want to know
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such information, and (v) his evasive and dishonest response to
Elkingtonfs investigation and his confirmation of a phony low
number representing the magnitude of Heatonfs thefts.

Steelco's

Brief contains much more.
The issue was presented (p.9).

Defendants state that their

"counsel did try to present the argument11 that the Utah Joint
Obligations Act, Utah Code Ann. §15-4-4, bars recovery in this
case, citing R451 at 42-62.

There, counsel and the court discuss

only the admissibility of two documents; defendants' counsel made
no such argument and did not even mention this defense or statute.
The settlement agreement (pp.12-13).

Defendants state that

"Elkington was told that the 1983 and 1984 records would be made
available at a more convenient time and with Heaton's authorization....11

The record citation given (R454 at 97-98) does not
2
support that statement.
Hurst never stated that he would make
additional records available at a more convenient time.
Footnote 4 on page 13 is a careful effort to suggest that
Heaton testified that he told Elkington about the commissions
before the Settlement Agreement and then changed his testimony
after a recess was "forfuitously" called.

Heaton first testified

At those pages, Hurst testified that he wasn't sure whether
there were earlier transactions (p.97, lines 3-7) and that Hurst
couldn't produce them (p.97, lines 11-17). Hurst also testified
that Elkington never asked to see the pre 1985 records. [R454,
p. 156.] Elkington unequivocally testified that Hurst told him
that the information for years prior to 1985 "was no longer
available." [R452 at 134.]
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tna

t "I can't remember the exact time when it was, but it was

before or at the time."

[R451 at 124.]

The underscored language

was conveniently deleted from defendants* quote.
called by the court.

The recess was

After the recess, as defendants' counsel

continued his examination, Heaton stated that he was unsure
whether he discussed commissions in connection with the Settlement Agreement or the later rescission of the Settlement Agreement.

[R451 at 125-26.]

Heaton warranted in the Settlement

Agreement that all unlawful activities were disclosed therein (no
kickbacks were mentioned); Elkington testified that he learned of
the kickbacks after the Settlement Agreement was executed.

[R452

at 147.]
Defendants did not know (pp.18-26).

At page 19, defendants

assert that Heaton's requests of Hurst not to say anything to
Steelco "were not made in the course of the sale of the remnant
or scrap cuttings but are supposed to have been made in the
course of the sale of material from the South Yard in 1986....,"
citing R451 at 8, 14, 16-19.

At pages 7-8, Heaton testified that

twenty or twenty-five such conversations occurred and that he
could not fix with precision the date of any of those conversations.
remnant.

He did not state that they did not relate to the sale of
Pages 14 and 16-19 contain no reference to any such

conversations.

At R451 p.77, however, Heaton testified that he

told Hurst "that Steelco mustn't know about it on practically
every occasion of our dealings."

At page 20, defendants claim

that whether the steel was stolen was never discussed after
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Heaton initially indicated to Hurst that the steel was his to
sell.

A review of R451 at 80 will reflect that the subject did

come up:

One of Hurst's employees once stated, a few months

after Heaton began dealing with Hurst, that the material looked
like it was "high rate stuff!f -- meaning "hot or stolen.11 In
addition to the incomplete material quoted at pages 52-53 of
defendants1 Reply Brief, one must review R451 pp. 76-77 -- Heaton
testified that the subject came up "every time I sold it" and
that on practically every occasion, Hurst was told that their
dealings must be kept secret.
At page 21, defendants suggest that Heaton initially paid
Steelco for the subject steel.

The record citation (R451 at

96-99) merely indicates that Heaton paid Steelco for a very
limited number of loads of steel, not that he paid for the steel
he resold to defendants. Heaton testified that he paid a total
of only $200-$300 for steel, that such steel was for his personal
use, and that he paid for none of the steel listed on Exhibits
1-5 (for which recovery was awarded).
90.]

[R450 at 202-03; R451 at

Defendants state at the top of page 21 that "Plaintiffs

have no answer for the fact that, when Heaton started the process
of buying and selling, his purchases were authorized,1' citing
references at page 10 of their Opening Brief.

The record does

indicate that a very few, very small purchases by Heaton were
authorized, but all of the testimony was that Heaton was not
authorized to purchase any material for resale. Only purchases
for his personal use were authorized.
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[R450 at 126-28; 195-96.]

The record does not show that Heaton was ever authorized to "buy
and sell" the same steel.

At pages 21-22, defendants claim that

the record does not support the fact that virtually all deliveries
were after Steelcofs hours (as the trial court specifically found
in its Memorandum Decision [R276]).

Steelco's business hours

concluded at 3:30; however, there was a second shift in Heaton's
department (a block away from the office), which was not supervised by anyone but Heaton.

Heaton made almost all of his

deliveries between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. or on Saturdays.

[R451 at

100-05.]
At page 22, defendants argue that their refusal to make
information available to Steelco's management was perfectly
normal, but that is completely inconsistent with defendants'
claim that they believed Heaton's dealings with Steelco were
completely authorized.

At page 23, defendants state that "no

records whatsoever were withheld" from Elkington.

Elkington

testified, on the other hand, that although he asked to see
Wasatch Steel's records for years prior to 1985, Hurst said "such
information was no longer available."

[R452 at 134.]

Defendants

then claim that Steelcofs assertion that the "only records
Elkington saw were those hand picked by Hurst" is "absolutely not
true."

Elkington testified that when he arrived at Wasatch

Steel's offices, Hurst had already segregated the receipts that
he showed Elkington from his other records.
Hurst did not deny this.

-8-

[R452 at 133.]

Evidence of conspiracy (pp. 27-28).

At the bottom of page

27, defendants state that "there is no evidence whatever" of
Hurst's lying to Elkington about unavailability of part of his
records and that Elkington "was never told they [records for
earlier years] did not exist or would not be produced."

Elkington

testified:
After reviewing the receipts for 1985, I also believed
that we had not yet seen everything. At that point I
walked down the stairs ... and I told Mr. Hurst I would
like to see earlier years' information. And at that
time he told me that such information was no longer
available. [R452 at 134.]
*""
Information for 1983 and 1984 was available, contrary to Mr.
Hurst's false statement.

[Exs. 1-P and 2-P.]

Defendants next

claim that "there is no evidence whatever" of any agreement
between Hurst and Heaton to confirm a phony amount of purchases.
Here is the evidence:

After Elkington discovered the thefts, and

before Elkington spoke with Hurst, Heaton spoke with Hurst.
[R450 at 101.]

During that conversation, Heaton asked Hurst not

to reveal all of his dealings with Heaton.

[R450 at 101-02.]

Heaton then gave Elkington a letter in which he indicated that he
and Hurst had found that "he [Hurst] had paid me a total of
$9,185.85" and that "if you like please call Lynn and he can
confirm this amount."

[Ex. 20-P; R452 at 130.]

After receiving

that letter, Elkington contacted Hurst and asked him whether the
amount of his dealings with Wasatch Steel was $9,100, approximately, and asked Hurst if that was accurate.
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Elkington testified

that Hurst stated "he said he thought it was.11

[R452 at 132.]

In fact, the amount was over four times that sum.
The commissions (pp.29-32).

[Ex. 27-P.]

Defendants characteristically

ignore all evidence but the testimony of Hurst.

The court found

that Hurst paid at least eleven kickbacks, not four.

[R358 161.]

Heaton testified that Hurst paid him at least four kickbacks in
addition to the four admitted by Hurst, for a total of at least
eight kickbacks to Heaton.

[Ex. 13-P; R451 at 26-30.] Hurst

admitted paying four kickbacks, but he also testified that he did
not know whether the remaining four to Heaton were or were not
kickbacks.

[R450 at 94-100.]

The eight Heaton kickbacks and

their compelling mathematical relationship to Steelco's contemporaneous purchases are summarized on Exhibit 28-P. Chris
Williams testified that she received at least three kickbacks
from Hurst.

[R451 at 169.]

On page 30, defendants again incor-

rectly state that Elkington was shown everything that he requested
3
and sought nothing more than he received at Wasatch Steel.
Elkington also inquired whether anyone other than Heaton was
involved.

Hurst responded negatively, although that was false

(Chris Williams was also involved in both steel deliveries and
kickbacks).

[R452 at 135; R450 at 106-07.] Although Hurst

admitted that it would have been important for Elkington to know
about the kickbacks, Hurst never told Elkington about them.

See discussion at pages 3-4 above.
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[R454 at 157-59.]

At page 30, defendants argue that Steelco

cannot fairly complain about the "roughness11 of the material that
it received through the kickback transactions.

Hurst admitted

that Heaton told him "I need some commission [a kickback] to get
them [Steelco] to use this rough of material."

[R454 at 152-54.]

Steelcofs complaint with the roughness of the material is that
Hurst bribed its employees to induce them to cause Steelco to pay
inflated prices for unusable or unsuitable junk -- the subject
materials were not suitable for their intended purpose.

[Exs.

35-P - 44-P; R452 at 80-94.]
At page 31, defendants, using selective citations to the
record, attempt to avoid the impact of Hurst's production at
trial of records that he claimed in his deposition had been
stolen at the end of 1987 (coincidentally just after Hurst
learned that Steelco was investigating Heaton1s dealings with
Wasatch Steel).

[R454 at 120-26.]

The thrust of defendants1

argument is that Hurst only indicated that his journals of cash
transactions were stolen, but never indicated that other records
were stolen.

Defendants mischaracterize the record.

Mr. Hurst

testified in his deposition that all of his cash records for 1986
were stolen -- "everything.11

In addition, Steelcofs Request for

Production of Documents to defendants requested in paragraph 13

"Q: What records does Wasatch Steel have that shows cash
receipts and disbursements during 1986? A: Cash receipts and
disbursements? Q: Yes. A: Our entire books, our entire set of
books were stolen at the end of -- what did I tell -- '87. Mr.
Garrett: You will have to answer the question the best you can.
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all documents that you intend to introduce into evidence at the
trial of this action."

[R66.]

Neither Ex. 53-D nor the cash

records summarized therein were ever produced.

At trial, Hurst

testified that he researched his "records" for March 1986 through
July of 1986 and determined daily cash deposits, from which he
compiled Exhibit 53-D.

[R454 at 119-20.]

Thus, when Hurst's

counsel asked him about records detailing cash transactions, he
was able to locate and utilize his records.

During his deposi-

tion, when he was asked about the same "records," he claimed
they -- "everything" -- had been stolen.

Defendants' remarkable

response is that Steelco should have obtained the "stolen"
records from another source and that the trial court should not
have been concerned about Mr. Hurst's contradictory testimony!
The superintendent's authority.

At page 35, defendants

again diligently attempt to suggest to this Court that Heaton had
express authority to buy and then resell the steel in question.
As demonstrated above, everyone testified that Heaton had no
authority to purchase steel for resale and Heaton himself testified that all of the steel for which Steelco achieved recovery in
this case was stolen.

Defendants confuse authority to sell

material for Steelco, on the one hand, and the obvious absence of
authority to steal material from Steelco and resell it for
Heaton's own personal benefit, on the other hand.

A: And I don't have any records detailing cash transactions. Q:
For what periodV A; For '8b. like you askecT Q: Do you have any
for prior periods? A: No. * * * Q; What Tecords were stolen?
A: Everything
" R454 pp. 122-23.
-12-

Heaton was a thief.

At pages 36-37, defendants argue that a

person who obtains property by fraud can transfer good title to a
bona fide purchaser and that, therefore, there can be no conversion here.

However, all the steel was indisputably stolen.

[R337-38.]

Defendants concede that a thief cannot pass good

title.

Defendants inaccurately argue that they did not receive

credit for the full value of the scrap given to Heaton.

Exhibits

30 and 31 (R368-74) demonstrate that the court gave a credit
[ftest. value of scrap fabricated beams given to Heaton11] of the
amount paid for scrap on the fraud claim (value to Steelco) and
double that amount on the conversion claim (retail value).

See

Ex. 27; R341 at 122; R452 at 164-65.
At page 37, defendants suggest that the trial court did not
properly account for the steel that was paid for by or given to
Heaton.

That the trial court did so is demonstrated at pages

12-14 of Steelcofs Opening Brief.

Heaton paid only $200-$300 to

Steelco for materials and they were for his personal use.
at 202-03; R451 at 90.]
recovered was stolen.

[R450

All of the steel for which Steelco
[R450 at 201-05.]

Defendants state that

Heaton made cash payments for which Steelco kept no record.
record does not support that statement.

The

At best, the record

shows that Heaton may have made some payments in 1983, but
Steelco had no receipts earlier than 1984.

Heaton conceded that

his earliest purchases may have been in 1984.
138.]

[R451 at 100,

Heaton claimed to have paid Steelco $200-$300, and Steelco

had invoices for Heaton's purchases totaling $400 -- a close
correlation.

[Ex. 16-P; R452 at 136-37.]

The damage award.

At page 40, defendants claim that Heaton

did not sell mainly remnant material to Wasatch Steel. Hurst
testified that his intention was to purchase new remnant material
that could be resold, rather than scrap.

[R450 at 40-41.]

Heaton testified that the material he sold to Wasatch Steel was
almost exclusively remnant, not scrap.

[R450 at 202-03; R117.]

The court found that the steel was "almost all remnant material."
[R337 at 18.]

Defendants next claim that there is no record

support for the assertion that the remnant steel that was stolen
was taken from remnant racks where it was placed to be reused as
new steel by Steelco.

Heaton testified that the stolen steel was

generally new steel left after cutting a new piece of steel for a
customer (i.e., remnant).

[R450 at 202-03.]

Remnant was stored

separately from the scrap -- in designated locations inside the
shop and sometimes outside.

[R451 at 87-89.]

Scrap was deposited

in special scrap tubs; remnant was deposited in racks to be used
at a future time.

[R450 at 118-22.]

Defendants are wrong.

The punitive damage award (pp. 41-44).
ignore their own outrageous conduct.

Here, defendants

Instead, defendants claim

that the damage award in this case will destroy Wasatch (a fact
that was not found by the court and is not supported by the
record).

Defendants fault Steelco for coming to them for

Hurst testified that Wasatch Steel might be worth a million
dollars [R454 at 32-33] and that Wasatch Steel makes about $9,000

payment rather than to Steelcofs insurance carrier

and that

Steelco's vigorous pursuit of this action was improper.

Steelco

can be expected to be upset by another company in the steel
business that systematically bribes its employees and helpfully
facilitates scores of thefts and resales of its property.

The

fact is that Wasatch Steel and Lynn Hurst systematically engaged
7
8
in dishonest, fraudulent, criminal , "sleazy"
Conclusion.
findings.

practices.

The record supports each of the trial court's

Those findings can be overturned only if Hurst, who

admits paying kickbacks and participating in "sleazy" practices,
and who was impeached again and again, is believed over all the
other witnesses, who testified consistently.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

4y^&&

s£

February, 1992.

Maak, Of Counsel
,, PARR, WADDOUPS, BROWN & GEE
Attorneys for Plaintiffs, Appellees,
and Cross-Appellants

per month in clear profit -- in just one year Wasatch Steel makes
more in clear profit than the court's punitive damage award.
[R454 at 32.]
It is uncontested that Steelco recovered nothing from any
insurance with respect to the claims asserted in this case.
See Opening Brief at page 84 for a list of the crimes.
Q

Hurst in his deposition admitted that the kickbacks were a
"sleazy" practice. At trial, he testified, directly contrary to
his deposition, that he approves the practice of an employee's
receipt of secret kickbacks. The propriety of a punitive damage
award in this case is demonstrated with transparent clarity by
Mr. Hurst's testimony on this subject at R450 at 78-89 and R454
at 151-59.
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